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OPINION 
________________ 
 
SMITH, Circuit Judge.    
 Keith Allen Cooper (“Cooper”) is a sex offender 
who was convicted of rape in Oklahoma and paroled 
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prior to the enactment of the Sex Offender Registration 
and Notification Act (“SORNA” or the “Act”), Pub. L. 
No. 109-248, 120 Stat. 587, 590–611 (2006) (codified 
primarily at 18 U.S.C. § 2250 & 42 U.S.C. § 16901 et 
seq.). After Congress enacted SORNA, Cooper was 
convicted of failing to comply with the sex offender 
registration requirements set forth in SORNA. In 
bringing this appeal, Cooper invokes the nondelegation 
doctrine, challenging the constitutionality of the 
provision of SORNA in which Congress delegated to the 
Attorney General the authority to determine the 
applicability of the Act’s registration requirements to pre-
SORNA sex offenders. 
 We conclude that SORNA does not violate the 
nondelegation doctrine. Accordingly, we will affirm 
Cooper’s conviction. 
I 
 In 1999, Cooper was convicted in Oklahoma state 
court on three counts of rape in the first degree. Cooper 
was paroled in January 2006. As required by pre-SORNA 
law, he registered as a sex offender in Oklahoma on or 
around January 20, 2006.  
 In July 2006, Congress enacted SORNA, which 
requires sex offenders to comply with specific 
registration requirements and to update registration 
information in the event of a change of name, address, 
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employment, or student status. Pursuant to the 
promulgation of an administrative rule on February 28, 
2007, and subsequent issuance of a final rule, the 
Attorney General made SORNA’s registration 
requirements applicable to individuals (such as Cooper) 
who were convicted of sex offenses prior to the 
enactment of SORNA. 
 In or around early 2011, Cooper moved from 
Oklahoma to Delaware. Although SORNA required 
Cooper to notify authorities of this change in residence, 
Cooper did not provide either Oklahoma or Delaware 
authorities with his updated residence information, nor 
did he separately register as a sex offender in Delaware 
after moving there. 
 In 2012, Cooper was arrested and charged with 
one count of failure to register as a sex offender, in 
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2250(a), in the United States 
District Court for the District of Delaware. On November 
2, 2012, Cooper moved to dismiss the indictment on the 
basis that, inter alia, SORNA’s delegation of authority to 
the Attorney General to determine the applicability of the 
Act’s registration requirements to pre-SORNA sex 
offenders violates the nondelegation doctrine and thus is 
unconstitutional. The District Court denied Cooper’s 
motion to dismiss. 
 Cooper pled guilty but reserved his right to appeal 
from the denial of the motion to dismiss. The District 
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Court sentenced him to eighteen months’ imprisonment, 
ten years of supervised release, and a special assessment 
of $100.00. Cooper then brought this timely appeal. 
II 
 Congress enacted SORNA as Title I of the Adam 
Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act of 2006, Pub. L. 
No. 109-248, §§ 101-155, 120 Stat. 587, 590-611 (2006). 
As set forth in the statute’s declaration of purpose, 
Congress enacted SORNA “to protect the public from 
sex offenders and offenders against children” by 
“establish[ing] a comprehensive national system for the 
registration of [sex] offenders.” 42 U.S.C. § 16901. 
SORNA “reflects Congress’ awareness that pre-Act 
registration law consisted of a patchwork of federal and 
50 individual state registration systems.” Reynolds v. 
United States, 132 S. Ct. 975, 978 (2012). Thus, “[t]he 
SORNA reforms are generally designed to strengthen and 
increase the effectiveness of sex offender registration and 
notification for the protection of the public, and to 
eliminate potential gaps and loopholes under the pre-
existing standards by means of which sex offenders could 
attempt to evade registration requirements or the 
consequences of registration violations.” The National 
Guidelines for Sex Offender Registration and 
Notification, 72 Fed. Reg. 30210-01, 30210 (May 30, 
2007). 
 SORNA specifies that all sex offenders “shall 
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register, and keep the registration current,” in each state 
where the offender lives, works, or attends school. 42 
U.S.C. § 16913(a). When an offender changes his name, 
residence, employment, or student status, within three 
business days the offender is required to appear in person 
in at least one jurisdiction where the offender lives, 
works, or is a student to notify that jurisdiction of the 
change in registration information. 42 U.S.C. § 16913(c). 
SORNA requires that the jurisdiction receiving this 
information immediately provide it to all other 
jurisdictions in which the offender is required to register 
in order to achieve a comprehensive national registry. Id.  
 Relevant to this appeal, SORNA makes it a federal 
crime for any person who is required to register, and who 
travels in interstate or foreign commerce, to knowingly 
fail to register or to update registration. 18 U.S.C. 
§ 2250(a).1 Once a sex offender is subject to SORNA’s 
                                                 
1  18 U.S.C. § 2250(a) provides:  
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registration requirements, that offender can be convicted 
under § 2250 if he thereafter engages in interstate or 
foreign travel and then fails to register.  See Carr v. 
United States, 560 U.S. 438, 447 (2010). 
The statute defines “sex offender” to include 
individuals who were convicted of sex offenses prior to 
the enactment of SORNA. 42 U.S.C. § 16911(1) 
(defining “sex offender” as “an individual who was 
convicted of a sex offense”); see also Reynolds, 132 S. 
Ct. at 978 (noting that SORNA “defines the term ‘sex 
offender’ as including these pre-Act offenders”). 
However, SORNA does not set forth the registration 
                                                                                                             
Whoever (1) is required to register under the 
Sex Offender Registration and Notification 
Act; (2)(A) is a sex offender as defined for 
the purposes of the Sex Offender 
Registration and Notification Act by reason 
of a conviction under Federal law (including 
the Uniform Code of Military Justice), the 
law of the District of Columbia, Indian tribal 
law, or the law of any territory or possession 
of the United States; or (B) travels in 
interstate or foreign commerce, or enters or 
leaves, or resides in, Indian country; and (3) 
knowingly fails to register or update a 
registration as required by the Sex Offender 
Registration and Notification Act; shall be 
fined under this title or imprisoned not more 
than 10 years, or both. 
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procedures for pre-SORNA sex offenders. Instead, in 42 
U.S.C. § 16913(d), Congress delegated to the United 
States Attorney General the authority to determine 
whether SORNA’s registration requirements would apply 
retroactively to pre-SORNA sex offenders. 
Section 16913(d) provides: 
The Attorney General shall have the 
authority to specify the applicability of the 
requirements of this subchapter to sex 
offenders convicted before the enactment of 
this chapter or its implementation in a 
particular jurisdiction, and to prescribe rules 
for the registration of any such sex 
offenders . . . . 
42 U.S.C. § 16913(d). 
 On February 28, 2007, pursuant to the authority 
delegated to it by § 16913(d), the Attorney General 
issued an immediately effective rule establishing that 
“[t]he requirements [of SORNA] apply to all sex 
offenders, including sex offenders convicted of the 
offense for which registration is required prior to the 
enactment of the Act.” Applicability of the Sex Offender 
Registration and Notification Act, 72 Fed. Reg. 8894-01, 
8897 (Feb. 28, 2007) (codified at 28 C.F.R. § 72.3). The 
Attorney General subsequently issued proposed 
guidelines for the interpretation and implementation of 
SORNA on May 30, 2007, reiterating that SORNA’s 
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registration requirements apply retroactively to pre-
SORNA offenders. See The National Guidelines for Sex 
Offender Registration and Notification, 72 Fed. Reg. 
30210-01, 30212 (May 30, 2007). Additional rules, 
repeating that SORNA’s registration requirements apply 
to pre-SORNA sex offenders, were promulgated on July 
2, 2008. See The National Guidelines for Sex Offender 
Registration and Notification, 73 Fed. Reg. 38030-01, 
38035–36 (July 2, 2008). The Attorney General 
subsequently issued a Final Rule, which became effective 
as of January 28, 2011. See Applicability of the Sex 
Offender Registration and Notification Act, 75 Fed. Reg. 
81849-01 (Dec. 29, 2010).2 
III 
 The District Court had original jurisdiction 
pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3231. We have appellate 
jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  
 We exercise plenary review over this challenge to 
the constitutionality of SORNA. United States v. 
                                                 
2  Cooper does not contest that by the time he moved 
to Delaware in or around early 2011, the Attorney 
General had validly promulgated rules requiring pre-
SORNA sex offenders to register and keep their 
registration current. Cooper challenges only the 
constitutionality of the section of SORNA that delegated 
the authority to promulgate such rules to the Attorney 
General. 
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Pendleton, 636 F.3d 78, 82 (3d Cir. 2011). 
IV 
 Cooper’s sole argument on appeal is that his 
conviction should be vacated because Congress violated 
the nondelegation doctrine when it delegated its authority 
to the Attorney General to determine the applicability of 
SORNA’s registration requirements to pre-SORNA sex 
offenders. See 42 U.S.C. § 16913(d). 
 The nondelegation doctrine “is rooted in the 
principle of separation of powers that underlies our 
tripartite system of Government.” Mistretta v. United 
States, 488 U.S. 361, 371 (1989). Article I, Section 1 of 
the Constitution provides: “All legislative powers herein 
granted shall be vested in a Congress of the United 
States.” U.S. Const. art. I, § 1. Thus, to safeguard the 
separation of powers enshrined in the Constitution, “‘the 
integrity and maintenance of the system of government 
ordained by the Constitution’ mandate that Congress 
generally cannot delegate its legislative power to another 
Branch.” Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 371–72 (quoting Field v. 
Clark, 143 U.S. 649, 692 (1892)). 
 Yet the history of the nondelegation doctrine 
reveals a wide gulf between the considerations rooted in 
the text of the Constitution and the jurisprudence that has 
since developed in the courts. In one of the first cases to 
give significant attention to the issue, Wayman v. 
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Southard, 23 U.S. 1 (1825), the Supreme Court 
considered a constitutional challenge to Congress’ 
delegation to the judicial branch of authority to establish 
procedural rules for service of process and execution of 
judgments. Upholding the constitutionality of this 
delegation, Chief Justice Marshall distinguished between 
the nondelegable “powers which are strictly and 
exclusively legislative” and “those of less interest, in 
which a general provision may be made, and power given 
to those who are to act under such general provisions to 
fill up the details.” Id. at 42–43. Marshall’s opinion noted 
also that the line between the delegable and nondelegable 
powers of Congress “has not been exactly drawn,” id. at 
43, concluding that the delegation in that suit did not 
implicate impermissible delegation of Congress’ 
legislative powers. 
A similar analysis is found in Field v. Clark, 143 
U.S. 649 (1892). That case involved a challenge to the 
constitutionality of an act authorizing the President to 
suspend tariff provisions for duty-free importation of 
certain goods in the event the President determined that 
such action was necessary to ensure reciprocal trade with 
foreign nations. The Supreme Court again recognized the 
importance of the prohibition against delegation of 
legislative power as essential to constitutional separation 
of powers. Id. at 692. However, the Court reasoned that 
the delegation raised no constitutional violation because 
the President was acting only as “the mere agent of the 
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law-making department to ascertain and declare the event 
upon which [Congress’] expressed will was to take 
effect.” Id. at 693.  
 United States v. Grimaud, 220 U.S. 506 (1911), 
involved a nondelegation doctrine challenge to an act 
authorizing the executive branch to make regulations for 
the use and occupancy of forest reservations. Defendants 
were charged with violating regulations promulgated by 
the Secretary of Agriculture prohibiting the grazing of 
sheep on reservation land without permit. Upholding the 
delegation, the Court held:  
From the beginning of the government, 
various acts have been passed conferring 
upon executive officers power to make 
rules and regulations,—not for the 
government of their departments, but for 
administering the laws which did govern. 
None of these statutes could confer 
legislative power. But when Congress had 
legislated and indicated its will, it could 
give to those who were to act under such 
general provisions ‘power to fill up the 
details’ by the establishment of 
administrative rules and regulations, the 
violation of which could be punished by 
fine or imprisonment fixed by Congress, or 
by penalties fixed by Congress, or 
measured by the injury done. 
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Id. at 517. Thus, where a violation of an offense has been 
made punishable by Congress, the Court concluded, there 
is no constitutional violation in the coordinate branch 
establishing regulations governing implementation and 
execution of the law, so long as the coordinate branch 
“confin[es itself] within the field covered by the 
statute . . . in order to administer the law and carry the 
statute into effect.” Id. at 518. 
 From these early cases, the modern nondelegation 
doctrine took shape in J.W. Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. 
United States, 276 U.S. 394 (1928). In Hampton, the 
Supreme Court considered a challenge to the 
constitutionality of a tariff act in which Congress 
delegated to the executive branch the authority to modify 
tariff levels when the President determined that 
prevailing rates were unequal between the United States 
and foreign countries. Upholding the constitutionality of 
the act, the Court emphasized the value of delegation of 
authority for the efficient operation of government. 
Nonetheless, the Court held that such delegated authority 
must be constrained by “defined limits, to secure the 
exact effect intended by [Congress’] acts of legislation,” 
and “the extent and character of that assistance must be 
fixed according to common sense and the inherent 
necessities of the governmental co-ordination.” Id. at 
406. In order to guide this analysis, Hampton established 
what became known as the “intelligible principle” test: 
“If Congress shall lay down by legislative act an 
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intelligible principle to which the person or body 
authorized to fix such rates is directed to conform, such 
legislative action is not a forbidden delegation of 
legislative power.” Id. at 409. The Court determined that 
the delegation in that case raised no constitutional 
problem, because the act merely authorized the President 
to carry out the purpose established by Congress and 
provided the Executive with an intelligible principle to 
guide this execution. 
 On only two occasions has the Court invalidated 
legislation based on the nondelegation doctrine, and both 
occurred in 1935.3 First, in Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 
293 U.S. 388 (1935) (Hughes, C.J.), the Court 
invalidated Section 9(c) of the National Industrial 
Recovery Act of 1933, which authorized the President to 
prohibit the shipment of oil produced in excess of state-
imposed quotas. The Court held that this portion of the 
Act was an impermissible delegation because it lacked 
any standard whatsoever to limit the President’s 
discretion: 
Section 9(c) does not state whether or in 
what circumstances or under what 
conditions the President is to prohibit the 
                                                 
3  Thus, it has been said that the nondelegation 
doctrine “has had one good year, and 211 bad ones (and 
counting).” Cass Sunstein, Nondelegation Canons, 67 U. 
Chi. L. Rev. 315, 322 (2000). 
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transportation of the amount of petroleum or 
petroleum products produced in excess of 
the state’s permission. It establishes no 
criterion to govern the President’s course. It 
does not require any finding by the President 
as a condition of his action. The Congress in 
section 9(c) thus declares no policy as to the 
transportation of the excess production. So 
far as this section is concerned, it gives to 
the President an unlimited authority to 
determine the policy and to lay down the 
prohibition, or not to lay it down, as he may 
see fit. And disobedience to his order is 
made a crime punishable by fine and 
imprisonment. 
Id. at 415. The Court concluded that this provision of the 
Act violated the constitutional maxim that “Congress 
manifestly is not permitted to abdicate or to transfer to 
others the essential legislative functions with which it is 
thus vested,” id. at 421, because it provided no guidance 
whatsoever to limit the discretion of the President in 
executing the power delegated to him. Id. at 430. 
 Similarly, in A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. 
United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935) (Hughes, C.J.), the 
Court struck down Section 3 of the National Industrial 
Recovery Act, which authorized the President to approve 
“codes of fair competition” for trades or industries, as an 
unconstitutional delegation of authority. The Court 
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emphasized that the statute completely failed to define 
“fair competition” and thus impermissibly transferred to 
the executive branch the power to create law: “Congress 
cannot delegate legislative power to the President to 
exercise an unfettered discretion to make whatever laws 
he thinks may be needed or advisable for the 
rehabilitation and expansion of trade or industry.” Id. at 
537–38.  
 Panama Refining and Schechter Poultry establish 
the “outer limits of [the] nondelegation precedents.” 
Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457, 474 
(2001). These decisions make clear that Congress cannot 
“provide[] literally no guidance for the exercise of 
discretion” and cannot “confer[] authority to regulate the 
entire economy on the basis of no more precise a 
standard than stimulating the economy by assuring ‘fair 
competition.’” Id.  
 But however bold these decisions may have been, 
they failed to alter the trajectory of the nondelegation 
doctrine. Shortly after the Hughes Court gave way to the 
Stone Court,4 the case of Yakus v. United States, 321 
U.S. 414 (1944), upheld a delegation to the Price 
Administrator (an executive official appointed by the 
President) to fix commodity prices at a “generally fair 
                                                 
4  Chief Justice Hughes retired, and former Associate 
Justice Harlan Fiske Stone succeeded him as Chief 
Justice, in 1941. 
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and equitable” level to effectuate the objectives of the 
Emergency Price Control Act. The Court noted that 
Congress had enacted the Emergency Price Control Act 
“in pursuance of a defined policy and required that the 
prices fixed by the Administrator should further that 
policy and conform to standards prescribed by the Act.” 
Id. at 423. Distinguishing Schechter Poultry, which 
prescribed no method for attaining the objective sought 
by Congress, the majority concluded that “Congress has 
stated the legislative objective, has prescribed the method 
of achieving that objective . . . and has laid down 
standards to guide the administrative determination” in 
exercising the delegated authority. Id. at 423. Further, the 
Court announced that invalidation of the delegation 
would only be proper if the act had a total “absence of 
standards for the guidance of the Administrator’s action, 
so that it would be impossible in a proper proceeding to 
ascertain whether the will of Congress has been obeyed . 
. . .” Id. at 426.  
 Writing in dissent, Justice Owen Roberts argued 
that the statute in Yakus was an unconstitutional 
delegation of congressional power. In Justice Roberts’s 
view, “the Act sets no limits upon the discretion or 
judgment of the Administrator. His commission is to take 
any action with respect to prices which he believes will 
preserve what he deems a sound economy . . . .” Yakus, 
321 U.S. at 451 (Roberts, J., dissenting). Justice Roberts 
plaintively argued that, in effect, the majority’s decision 
 18 
 
“le[ft] no doubt that [Schechter Poultry] is now 
overruled.” Id. at 452 (Roberts, J., dissenting). However, 
the fate of Schechter Poultry that Justice Roberts 
predicted did not come to pass. The Supreme Court’s 
continued attention to Panama Refining and Schechter 
Poultry signals that—while their continued existence is 
hardly robust—they nonetheless have continuing 
precedential force. See, e.g., Whitman, 531 U.S. at 474–
75; Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 373 n.7. 
 In a similar move away from Panama Refining and 
Schechter Poultry, American Power & Light Co. v. 
Securities & Exchange Comm’n, 329 U.S. 90 (1946), 
addressed a nondelegation challenge to Section 11 of the 
Public Utility Holding Company Act, which authorized 
the Securities and Exchange Commission to require 
companies to take steps the Commission deemed 
necessary to prevent holding companies from “unduly or 
unnecessarily complicat[ing] the [holding-company 
system] structure” or “unfairly or inequitably 
distribut[ing] voting power among security holders.” Id. 
at 97. Rejecting the contention that these phrases had no 
meaning (and thus provided no directives to guide the 
delegation of authority), the Court suggested that the 
larger context of the act itself could imbue these terms 
with sufficient meaning to guide the Commission, i.e. 
these terms “derive much meaningful content from the 
purpose of the Act, its factual background and the 
statutory context in which they appear.” Id. at 104. 
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Looking to the “express recital of evils” in the earliest 
sections of the statute, the policy declarations set forth by 
Congress, and standards and conditions established in 
sections of the statute apart from Section 11, the Court 
concluded “a veritable code of rules reveals itself for the 
Commission to follow in giving effect to the standards of 
§ 11(b)(2).” Id. at 105. Driven by a recognition that 
“judicial approval accorded these ‘broad’ standards for 
administrative action is a reflection of the necessities of 
modern legislation dealing with complex economic and 
social problems,” id., the Court determined that the 
statute posed no nondelegation problem. 
 The Supreme Court has not invalidated a statute 
for violating the nondelegation doctrine in the nearly 80 
years since Panama Refining and Schechter Poultry. In 
Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361 (1989), a 
criminal defendant challenged the constitutionality of 
Congress’ delegation of authority to the Sentencing 
Commission to promulgate determinative-sentence 
guidelines. The Court upheld this delegation on the basis 
of the intelligible principle test. Id. at 372–74. Mistretta 
reiterated that, in a modern society, delegations of 
authority are necessary to accommodate the technical and 
complex decisions that can accompany the 
implementation of legislation. Id. at 372. Upholding the 
delegation, the Court concluded that the grant of 
authority to the Sentencing Commission contained 
sufficient guidance and details in order to pass 
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constitutional muster. Id. at 374. 
Under modern application of the nondelegation 
doctrine, as long as Congress “lay[s] down by legislative 
act an intelligible principle to which the person or body 
authorized to exercise the delegated authority is directed 
to conform, such legislative action is not a forbidden 
delegation of legislative power.” Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 
372 (quoting Hampton, 276 U.S. at 406) (brackets 
omitted); see also Whitman, 531 U.S. at 472 (2001) 
(noting that Congress may not abdicate legislative power, 
but specifying that Congress may delegate 
“decisionmaking authority” to a coordinate branch of 
government as long as Congress lays down by legislative 
act an intelligible principle to which the coordinate 
branch is directed to conform). Under this test, a 
delegation is “constitutionally sufficient if Congress 
clearly delineates the general policy, the public agency 
which is to apply it, and the boundaries of this delegated 
authority.” Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 372–73 (quoting 
American Power & Light Co., 329 U.S. at 105). Thus, the 
Supreme Court has “‘almost never felt qualified to 
second-guess Congress regarding the permissible degree 
of policy judgment that can be left to those executing or 
applying the law.’” Whitman, 531 U.S. at 474–75 
(quoting Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 416 (Scalia, J., 
dissenting)).  
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V 
A. Cooper Urges Application of a “Meaningfully 
Constrains” Standard 
 Cooper argues that we should move the 
nondelegation jurisprudence in a new direction. Relying 
on Touby v. United States, 500 U.S. 160 (1991), and 
United States v. Amirnazmi, 645 F.3d 564 (3d Cir. 2011), 
Cooper urges us to apply a heightened “meaningfully 
constrains” standard to assess the delegation to the 
Attorney General in SORNA, arguing that a more 
rigorous standard must apply when Congress delegates 
discretion to impose criminal liability.  
 Whatever benefits may inhere in a heightened 
standard for cases in which Congress delegates authority 
to create criminal liability, we are mindful that the 
Supreme Court “has expressly refrained from deciding 
whether Congress must provide stricter guidance than a 
mere ‘intelligible principle’ when authorizing the 
Executive ‘to promulgate regulations that contemplate 
criminal sanctions.’” Amirnazmi, 645 F.3d at 575 
(quoting Touby, 500 U.S. at 165–66). The “meaningfully 
constrains” standard has been referenced in only a 
handful of cases, none of which set forth factors or a 
substantive analytical framework against which to assess 
whether a specific delegation satisfies that standard. In 
Amirnazmi, we did not resolve “the unsettled question of 
whether something more demanding than an ‘intelligible 
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principle’ is necessitated within the context of delegating 
authority to define criminal conduct.” Id. at 577. We 
likewise decline to do so here. Until the Supreme Court 
gives us clear guidance to the contrary, we assess the 
delegation of authority to the Attorney General in 42 
U.S.C. § 16913(d) under an intelligible principle 
standard.  
B. Analysis Under the Intelligible Principle Test 
 Applying the intelligible principle test, we 
conclude that Congress did not violate the nondelegation 
doctrine in delegating responsibility to the Attorney 
General to determine the applicability of SORNA’s 
registration requirements for pre-Act offenders in 42 
U.S.C. § 16913(d). In enacting SORNA, Congress laid 
out the general policy, the public agency to apply this 
policy, and the boundaries of the delegated authority. 
This is all that is required under the modern 
nondelegation jurisprudence. Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 372–
73. 
 SORNA contains a general policy goal to guide the 
Attorney General in applying the discretion delegated by 
the Act. The first section of SORNA makes clear that the 
Act’s aim is to establish a comprehensive national sex 
offender registry in order to protect children and the 
public at large from sex offenders. 42 U.S.C. § 16901. 
The Attorney General’s discretion, established in 
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§ 16913(d), is governed by this general policy statement.5 
Although we acknowledge that SORNA’s policy 
statement is broad and does not contain directives 
specifically aimed at the Attorney General, review of the 
history of the nondelegation doctrine reveals that far less 
precise policy statements have still passed muster. See, 
e.g., American Power & Light Co., 329 U.S. at 105; 
                                                 
5  We do not agree with the argument made by 
Cooper and the Amicus Curiae that our decision in 
United States v. Reynolds, 710 F.3d 498 (3d Cir. 2013), 
indicates that SORNA’s general policy rationale is 
constitutionally insufficient. In Reynolds, we determined 
that the Attorney General failed to show good cause for 
waiving the Administrative Procedure Act’s notice and 
comment requirements in the issuance of the interim rule 
regarding retroactivity of SORNA’s registration 
requirements in February 2007. In so holding, we noted 
that the Attorney General’s restatement of SORNA’s 
public safety rationale by itself did not constitute good 
cause to ignore the advance comment period required by 
the Administrative Procedure Act. Id. at 512. Our 
reasoning in Reynolds is not directly applicable to this 
appeal. Here we assess the constitutionality of SORNA in 
light of Supreme Court precedent on the nondelegation 
doctrine. Thus, we decline to deviate from that precedent 
based on our discussion in Reynolds of the Attorney 
General’s action in issuing rules under the Administrative 
Procedure Act. 
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Yakus, 321 U.S. at 420–23. 
 Second, the intelligible principle test requires that 
Congress identify the recipient of the delegated authority. 
Section 16913(d) unambiguously designates the Attorney 
General as the recipient of the delegation. 42 U.S.C. 
§ 16913(d). 
 Finally, while § 16913(d) itself contains no 
limitations on the Attorney General’s discretion, we 
understand the discretion delegated to the Attorney 
General in § 16913(d) to be constrained by the legislative 
determinations that Congress made in other sections of 
SORNA. See American Power & Light Co., 329 U.S. at 
104–05. In SORNA, Congress identified the crimes that 
require registration, 42 U.S.C. § 16911; where the 
offender must register, 42 U.S.C. § 16913(a); the time 
period in which registration must be completed, 42 
U.S.C. § 16913(b); the method of registration, 42 U.S.C. 
§ 16913(b)-(c); the information that sex offenders must 
provide in order to register, 42 U.S.C. § 16914(a); and 
the elements of the crime of failure to register, 28 U.S.C. 
§ 2250. Further, the boundaries of the Attorney General’s 
authority are constrained by the task delegated by 
Congress. In responding to the directive in Section 
16913(d), the Attorney General can only determine the 
specific question of whether SORNA’s registration 
requirements apply to pre-SORNA sex offenders.  
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VI 
It may well be, as Justice Scalia has written, that in 
delegating this responsibility to the Attorney General, 
Congress “sail[ed] close to the wind with regard to the 
principle that legislative powers are nondelegable.” 
Reynolds v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 975, 986 (2012) 
(Scalia, J., dissenting). Indeed, we are puzzled as to why 
Congress decided to delegate to the Attorney General the 
authority to determine the applicability of SORNA’s 
registration requirements to pre-SORNA offenders. The 
decision to make SORNA’s registration requirements 
applicable to pre-Act offenders is a weighty one—
particularly for the class of pre-SORNA offenders 
affected by that decision. Although we find Congress’ 
delegation of this important decision curious at best, we 
hold that it does not amount to an unconstitutional 
abdication.  
Under controlling nondelegation doctrine 
jurisprudence, the hurdle for the government in this case 
is not high.6 Applying the precedential authority on the 
                                                 
6  Each of our sister circuits to have considered the 
issue has concluded that SORNA does not violate the 
nondelegation doctrine. See, e.g., United States v. 
Goodwin, 717 F.3d 511, 516–17 (7th Cir. 2013), cert. 
denied, __ U.S. __, 134 S. Ct. 334 (2013); United States 
v. Kuehl, 706 F.3d 917, 919–20 (8th Cir. 2013); United 
States v. Parks, 698 F.3d 1, 7–8 (1st Cir. 2012), cert. 
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nondelegation doctrine, we conclude that SORNA’s 
delegation to the Attorney General in 42 U.S.C. 
§ 16913(d) does not violate the nondelegation doctrine. 
Accordingly, we will affirm. 
 
                                                                                                             
denied, __ U.S. __, 133 S. Ct. 2021 (2013); United States 
v. Rogers, 468 F. App’x 359, 362 (4th Cir. 2012) (not 
precedential), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 157 (2012); United 
States v. Felts, 674 F.3d 599, 606 (6th Cir. 2012); United 
States v. Guzman, 591 F.3d 83, 92–93 (2d Cir. 2010), 
cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 3487 (2010); United States v. 
Whaley, 577 F.3d 254, 263–64 (5th Cir. 2009); United 
States v. Ambert, 561 F.3d 1202, 1213–14 (11th Cir. 
2009). 
